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WHY SIMPLE FOREKNOWLEDGE OFFERS NO
MORE PROVIDENTIAL CONTROL THAN THE
OPENNESS OF GOD
John Sanders
This paper examines the question of whether the theory of simply foreknowledge (SF) provides God with greater providential control than does
the theory of present knowledge (PK). It is claimed by the proponents of SF
that a deity lacking such knowledge would not be able to provide the sort
of providential aid commonly thought by theists to be given by God. To see
whether this is the case I first distinguish two different versions of how
God's foreknowledge is accessed according to simple foreknowledge. These
two versions are then utilized to examine seven different areas of divine
providence to assess the utility of simple foreknowledge. I conclude that SF
affords no greater providential control than PK.

Does a God with simple foreknowledge (SF) possess greater providential control than a God with present knowledge (PK)? It is claimed by
the proponents of SF that a deity lacking such knowledge would not be
able to provide the sort of providential aid commonly thought by theists
to be given by God. To see whether this is the case I first distinguish two
different versions regarding how God's foreknowledge is accessed
according to simple foreknowledge. These two versions are then utilized
to examine seven separate areas of divine providence to asses the utility
of simple foreknowledge. I conclude that SF affords no greater providential control than PK.

Introduction
According to the theory of simple foreknowledge God has direct
vision of all future events. God does not cause all these events to happen, nor is his knowledge inferred from what has happened in the past.
Rather, God has direct noninferential apprehension of the future. The
foreknowledge God has of what creatures with libertarian freedom will
do is dependent on, and logically subsequent to, what the creatures actually decide to do.] That is, what the creatures decide affects what God
knows the future to be. "Once" God decided to create this world then
God apprehended all that would ever happen-right down to the movements of quarks-in this world.
For the openness of God model, God has only present knowledge of
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what free creatures do and only possesses "foreknowledge" of the specific actions he determines to do in the future. God knows all that has
happened and all that is happening-right down to the movements of
quarks-and may infer or believe that certain things will occur in the
future. But God does not know the future actions of free creatures.
Moreover, even how and if some of the divine intentions will be actualized are not known in a hard sense since they depend upon God's reaction to human decisions.' In the openness model God is understood to
be responsive to the creatures he made. There is a give-and-take dynamic between God and his creation.
Some people are attracted to the element of divine responsiveness in
the openness model but find two significant problems with the openness
theory. First, they understand the nature of biblical prophecy to imply
that God has foreknowledge of the future. If God has SF then, it is
claimed, he can predict the future through his prophets. Second, they
believe the open God model implies too much divine risk in providence
such that God cannot guarantee the end from the beginning. A God
lacking omniprescience cannot meet the challenges of the future. David
Hunt claims that "divine control will be hamstrung and God's purposes
jeopardized if events can ever catch Him by surprise, or find Him unprepared, or force Him to react after the fact to patch things up .... the kind of
providential control expected of a theistic God is possible only on the
assumption of foreknowledge."3 Both of these problems are overcome,
it is claimed, if God possesses SF.
Theologian Jack Cottrell maintains that SF is a key element in God's
providential control over the world. He says,
Because it is by this means that God can allow man to be truly
free in his choices, even free to resist his own special influences,
and at the same time work out his own purposes infallibly. For
if God foreknows all the choices that every person will make, he
can make his own plans accordingly, fitting his purposes
around these foreknown decisions and actions .... Acts 2:23 is a
perfect illustration of the way God works through his foreknowledge .... On the one hand, God had predetermined that
Jesus would die as a propitiation for the sins of the world; this
was his own unconditional plan for saving the world. On the
other hand, the details of how this would be accomplished were
planned in relation to God's foreknowledge of the historical situation and of the character and choices of men such as Judas. 4
These are strong claims for the providential benefits of SF. Before
examining the validity of these claims, I think it important to distinguish two different versions of how God's foreknowledge is accessed.
SF is commonly explained as God "seeing the whole at once" and thus,
knowing all that will happen. In this way God atemporally learns all at
once everything that his free creatures will do. For example, God previsioned before the creation of the world my birth, sibling rivalries,
marriage, adoption of children, writing this paper, etc. What God pre-
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visioned, moreover, included all the details leading up to and surrounding all these events-right down to the number of hairs on my
head at any given moment. This vision of God happens all at once and
even though he knows things will occur in sequence God does not
acquire the knowledge in sequence. God simply sees the whole at
once. I shall coin the term "Complete Simple Foreknowledge" (CSF)
for this version of SF.
Unfortunately, CSF has a difficult time explaining how God can
intervene in what he foresees will happen. The problem arises because
of the fact that what God previsions is what will actually occur. Divine
foreknowledge, by definition, is always correct. If what will actually
happen is, for example, the holocaust, then God knows it is going to
happen and cannot prevent it from happening since his foreknowledge
is never mistaken. Furthermore, if what God has foreseen is the entire
human history at once, then the difficulty is to somehow allow for God's
intervention into that history since, presumably, his prevision did not
include his own actions.s For example, if God sees Abraham's birth, life
and death all at once then how does God interject the test of the binding
of Isaac (Gen. 22) into Abraham's life? How does God see God's own
actions in Abraham's life which would alter Abraham's life and consequently change God's foreknowledge? Even more seriously, if God
sees all of human history and the sin involved in it, but not his own
actions, then this foreknowledge does not include any redemption from
sin and God cannot save the creatures he is about to create. Hunt is correct that a God "with total foreknowledge .. .is equipped to make maximally informed decisions-but there is nothing left to be decided."6 In
this state of affairs there is no room for any providential activity if God
sees the whole at once. 7 This raises the specter of deism which is unacceptable for orthodox theists.
Not surprisingly some believers in SF have sought a different explanation of God's direct apprehension of the future, one that allows for
God to act providentially. In this version God timelessly accesses the
future in sequence or incrementally.s That is, not in a temporal sequence,
but in what might be called an explanatory order.9 God sort of atemporally rolls the tape of the future up to a certain point and then stops it in
order to interject his own actions into the tape and then rolls the tape
further to see what his creatures will do in response to his actions. Then
God again decides what he will do and then rolls the tape further.
Hence, there is a logical sequence or order of dependence in the way
God comes to access his foreknowledge. In this version God still learns
the future, atemporally of course, but he learns it in sequence. As a
result God can weave his own actions into the flow of human history. I
shall coin the term "Incremental Simple Foreknowledge" (lSF) to designate this view.
Does the theory of SF provide better support for the doctrine of providence than the openness model? I propose to examine seven different,
but related, aspects of the doctrine of providence to see what benefits, if
any, SF has over PK.
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Providential Uses of SF
1. Creation and Sin
Some people believe that a God with SF could have prevented the
free creatures from committing evil. Since God did not prevent sin from
happening, God is ultimately responsible. John Hick takes this line
when he says it is "hard to clear God from ultimate responsibility for the
existence of sin, in view of the fact that He chose to create a being whom
He foresaw would, if He created him, freely sin."l0 Lorenzo McCabe, a
nineteenth century Methodist theologian who wrote two lengthy treatments on foreknowledge, said that "a being who the Creator foreknew
would be disobedient should not be created .... How easy for omnipotence to prevent the existence of those who, as his omniscience foresaw,
would choose to be disobedient."l1 Cottrell gives the background for
this sort of providential control when he says, "It is foreknowledge that
enables God to maintain complete control of his world despite the freedom of his creatures. God knows the future; it is not open or indefinite
for him. This gives God the genuine option of either permitting or preventing men's planned choices, and prevention is the ultimate control."12
But can a God with CSF prevent sinners from being born or prevent
certain evil choices? No, for the simple reason that if what God foreknows
is the actual world then God foreknows the births, lives and deaths of
actual sinners. Once God has foreknowledge he cannot change what
will happen for that would make his foreknowledge incorrect. If God
foreknows (has actual knowledge) that Adam will freely choose to mistrust God, then God cannot intervene to prevent Adam from this mistrust. Hence, God can see the evil coming before he creates the world
but is powerless to prevent it. William Hasker is correct when he says,
[I]t is clear that God's foreknowledge cannot be used either to
bring about the occurrence of a foreknown event or to prevent
such an event from occurring. For what God foreknows is not
certain antecedents which, unless interfered with in some way,
will lead to the occurrence of the event; rather, it is the event itself
that is foreknown as occurring, and it is contradictory to suppose that an event is known to occur but then also is prevented
from occurring. In the logical order of dependence of events,
one might say, by the "time" God knows something will happen, it is "too late" either to bring about its happening or to prevent it from happeningY
The proponent of SF may appeal to Incremental Simple
Foreknowledge (ISF) in an attempt to rescue providential control. Thus,
God roles the tape forward and learns (prior to creation) that Adam is
succumbing to temptation-but does not role the tape far enough to see
whether he actually sins or not. At this point God may press the pause
button on his remote and decide to intervene in order to buttress
Adam's flagging trust. Will God's efforts be successful? To find out
God roles the tape forward to see how Adam will respond. 14 If Adam
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chooses to continue to trust God then the temptation is overcome. If he
fails to trust God then sin enters the world. Regardless, once God sees
the actual future choice of the creature he is powerless to prevent it.
Prior to the actual choice being made God can seek to persuade Adam to
trust God, but once God knows that Adam will fail to trust God then it is
too late for God to prevent the sin.
It must be remembered that a God with SF (either CFS or ISF) does
not have middle knowledge and so cannot "tryout" alternative scenarios in order to ascertain which one will achieve his objective in preventing Adam from sinning.ls A God with SF knows what will occur in the
actual world once he decides to create this world. But God does not
know before he decides to create this particular world what sorts of
decisions and actions a world containing individuals with libertarian
freedom will freely choose to do if created. Consequently, a God with SF
is no less a risk taker than a God with PK, for he could only gamble that
a desirable state of affairs would actually come about. Hence, God is
open to being surprised or disappointed by what he discovers will come
about. Thus, a God with SF might "luck out" in that his free creatures
never, in fact, decide to sin. But in this case there is no providential
advantage for a God with SF over a God with PK. In fact, the way God
providentially interacts with the world would be explained the same
way in both models.

2. Election
What of all those God foreknew would never exercise saving faith in
him and thus are not part of the elect of salvation? Can God decide not
to create them? James Mill, the father of John Stuart Mill, thought so.
'Think of a being," he says, "who would make a hell, who would create
the race with the infallible foreknowledge that the majority of them were
to be consigned to horrible and everlasting torment."16 Mill believed this
a serious objection to the existence of the Christian God.
Although this charge may carry some weight against theological
determinism it does not apply to SF because it misunderstands the
nature of foreknowledge. Early church fathers such as Justin Martyr and
Origen set forth a view of election, much later taken up by Arminius,
which sought to use SF without divine determinism.17 In their view God
uses his foreknowledge to see which individuals will freely come to faith
in Christ and God then decides to elect these people for eternal salvation. Hence, God's election is dependent on, and logically subsequent
to, the choice of the creatures even though God's election of them is temporally prior to creation. God atemporally responds to the free choices of
his creatures. 18
A God with SF takes risks in creating a world with libertarian freedom since it was possible, before God decided to create and had no foreknowledge of the actual world, that no single human being would love
God. This is as true for the theory of SF as for PK. Even with SF God
gains no more providential control over who is saved than a God with
PK. Hence, even a God with SF could, once he decided to create, have
learned through his foreknowledge that no humans would ever freely
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come to love him in response to his love for them. As it has, in fact,
turned out the actual world does, I believe, contain a number of people
who respond in faith to the divine love. But, it must be remembered,
this is not due to any providential use of his foreknowledge. One could
say that God "lucked out," or one could say that God was confident and
courageous enough to create a world where this tragic possibility existed but thankfully did not obtain. '9 Perhaps God had enough confidence
in his ability to love the creatures and in his planned incarnation into
human history that the risk was, from the divine point of view, worth
taking if not minimal.

3. Guidance and Protection
It is often assumed that a God with SF would be in a maximally
informed position to offer guidance and protection to those who petition
him in prayer. For instance, say Mandie asks God whether she should
marry Matthew or Jim, believing that God knows what is best for her
and will advise her accordingly. In fact, Mandie may believe, with C. S.
Lewis/o that a God with CSF knew of her prayer beforehand and so has
prearranged things (perhaps even prior to her birth) in such a way that
her request will be providentially answered. Mandie initiates her
request in good faith believing that since God knows the future he can
help her. She believes, for instance, that God knows whether Jim will be
loving or abusive towards her. Perhaps God knows that Jim will turn
out to be a drug dealer and quite abusive while Matthew will be a very
loving person. 21 Mandie believes that God would, in this case, give her
the guidance to marry Matthew. The problem is that if God knows that
she will actually marry Jim and be quite unhappy, then it is useless for
God to give her the guidance to marry Matthew. It would be incoherent
to claim that God, knowing the actual future and on the basis of this
knowledge, changes it so that it will not be the actual future. Of course,
God might foreknow that Jim will be a wonderful husband for Mandie.
Even so, it is not because God brought it about. A God who already
knows the future cannot answer such prayers.
Furthermore, a God with CSF not only knows the "big" decisions
Mandie will make, such as whom she will marry, but all the "little" ones
leading up to and surrounding them as well. Hence, God knows all the
details of her life as well as that of Jim's. If God sees that Mandie will be
a very impatient person in the future God cannot act to bring it about
that she become more patient than he foreknew. That is, God cannot
work to improve her character so that it falsifies his knowledge of what
he knew her character would be like. If God acts at all in her life it will,
presumably, make an impact on her and so change her if ever so slightly. But if God foreknows that such changes will never come about in her
life then God is prohibited, by his foreknowledge, from acting in her life
to improve her character.
Perhaps we can again salvage SF from such dreadful conclusions by
appealing to ISF. In this way God only accesses his foreknowledge up to
the point where Mandie invokes God for guidance as to whom she
should marry-but does not yet know whom she will actually marry. At
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this juncture God is free to advise her, but his advice is limited to what
he actually knows at present and what God surmises regarding the sorts
of husbands Matthew and Jim might become. Remember, at this point in
the tape God does not yet know the full development of their character
traits. God may have very good beliefs about such matters which are virtually (always?) correct. Yet, if this is the case then the advice a God with
ISF is able to give Mandie is no different from the advice a God with PK
is able to give.
The same is true concerning prayers for protection. If God knows
that I will be seriously injured in an auto accident on this particular trip,
then no prayer for "travelling mercies" can alter this situation.
Consequently, prayers for protection would be useless and any divine
interventions prohibited. Only if God does not yet know the outcome of
my journey can a prayer for safe traveling be coherent within the model
of SF.22 If God decides to act in response to my prayer it cannot be based
on his foreknowledge. Hence, this situation is no different from asking a
God with PK for safety in traveling.
4. Divine Repentance and Alternative Plans in the Divine-Human Dialogue
It is commonly thought that a God with CSF cannot "change his

mind" and will have no need of resorting to alternative plans in his
interactions with humans. The biblical texts speaking of divine repentance or alternative plans are taken to be simple anthropomorphisms.
Thus one's view of foreknowledge deeply impacts the way one reads the
biblical text. The story of Exodus 32 is a good case in point. In this story
Moses has been up on the mountain for quite some time receiving the
covenant from God. The people of Israel fashion and worship a golden
calf which arouses the divine anger against their idolatry. God tells
Moses to leave him alone so that he may destroy the people and begin
his plan of human redemption over again-this time starting with
Moses. Moses, however, does not agree with this "plan B" and so does
not leave God alone. Instead, he intercedes for the people giving God
three reasons why he should not carry out his threat. In response God
"changed his mind (Hebrew Nacham) about the disaster that he planned
to bring on his people" (32:14, NRSV).
How does the theory of CSF interpret such texts? Throughout history
many philosophers have thought that since God knew the future it was
literally impossible for God to change his mind or respond to his creatures in any way.23 Hence, Exodus 32:14 and the numerous other texts
referring to divine repentance and alternative plans were interpreted to
mean that from the human perspective God changed his mind, but God
always knew he was not going to do what was threatened. Why, then,
would God issue such threats? Some have suggested it is to teach Moses
just how much Moses cared for the people of Israel.
More problematic are texts such as 1 Samuel 2:30 where God revokes
a promise made to the priest Eli and his household. "Therefore the
LORD God of Israel declares: 'I promised that your family and the family of your ancestor should go in and out before me forever'; but now the
LORD declares: 'Far be it from me; for those who honor me I will honor,
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and those who despise me shall be treated with contempt.'" God had
made what appeared to be an unconditional promise to Eli for a perpetual priesthood; now, however, God responds to the sin of Eli's sons by
reneging on that promise. But if God always knew that he would never
fulfill that promise then it is a serious question whether God made the
promise with integrity.
ISF affords a way out of this problem. By employing ISF, we can
understand the text to mean that God genuinely intended to fulfill the
promise because he did not know, "when" he made the promise, the
future sins of Eli's sons. Once God "looked ahead" into the future then
he learned of their sins and could then revoke the promise without
being accused of mendacity. This interpretation of SF allows for God to
change his mind, resort to a "plan B" and truly be responsive to his creatures. A big plus for this view is that we are allowed to read the biblical
texts in a more straightforward way-as God entering into genuine
give-and-take relations with his creatures. Again, however, we see that
such an interpretation is identical to how the openness model would
explain such texts.

5. Can God be Mistaken?
Many people have thought that the divine perfection ruled out any
possibility of God being wrong in any judgment. If God has knowledge
rather than beliefs about the future then, of course, he cannot be mistaken about anything. Boethius said that "God sees everything in advance
and cannot be deceived in any way."24 Augustine agreed saying,
"Whoever says that anything can happen otherwise than as God has
foreknown it, is attempting to destroy the divine foreknowledge with
the most insensate impiety."25 Francis Beckwith has recently argued that
a God with PK would base prophetic utterances not on his knowledge of
the future but, rather, on his exhaustive knowledge of the past and present. He rejects this notion because "this means that it is within the
realm of possibility that God could make a mistake about the future."26
If God can be mistaken about what will happen in the future then divine
prophecies may be in doubt.
These thinkers seem to affirm CSF where God accesses his knowledge
of the future "all at once." In this version it is correct that God could
never be mistaken about the future. But the major objection to this version, as was mentioned above, is that it seems to render problematic any
divine intervention into the history God foresees. Before leaving CSF it
may be instructive to see how it would interpret a biblical text where
one of God's predictions is called into question.
The narrative of Moses' dialogue with God at the burning bush is fascinating because Moses suggests the possibility that God might be mistaken. In Exodus chapter three God seeks to enlist Moses in the divine
service. Moses is reluctant, however, and gives God five reasons why he
is not the right man for the job. In 3:16-22 God instructs Moses to gather
the elders of Israel together and inform them of their impending liberation. Moreover, God explicitly says (v. 18) that the leaders will believe
Moses. Perhaps Moses' understanding of divine foreknowledge was
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inadequate for he replies to God, "But suppose they do not believe me
or listen to me?" (4:1). God responds by giving Moses a "sign" to perform before the elders-his rod turns into a serpent. God then declares
that the purpose of this sign is "so that they may believe that the
LORD ... has appeared to you." (4:5). God then gives Moses a second
sign-his skin becomes cancerous and is then healed (4:6-7). Amazingly,
God then says, "If they will not believe you or heed the first sign, they may
believe the second sign. If they will not believe even these two signs or
heed you" (4:8-9) then here is a third sign.
According to CSF Moses' question is ridiculous for God knows precisely what will happen in the future and if God says it then that is the
way it is going to be. Moses' understanding of divine foreknowledge is
erroneous (a genuine possibility). The passage should be interpreted to
mean that God condescended to Moses' frailty and "played along" with
him in order to give Moses greater confidence to undertake his mission.
God knew they would believe but perhaps God also knew that they
would only believe on the witness of the signs and so it is important for
Moses to make this sort of request. The question remains, however,
whether this interpretation does full justice to the statements "if they
will not believe yoU.,,27
On the other hand, if we go with ISF where God accesses his knowledge of the future incrementally then we arrive at the astonishing conclusion that God could indeed be mistaken about the future. For in this
view God does not know, at the time he is speaking with Moses,
whether or not the elders will actually believe Moses. God may have a
very good idea of their predisposition to believe but the possibility
remains that God could be mistaken. Hence, on this view Moses' question is quite appropriate and so are the signs given to Moses.
Furthermore, the language of the biblical text retains its prima facie
integrity. Yet, it must be acknowledged that this interpretation is in full
agreement with a PK reading of the text.
But this raises the possibility that some of God's predictions may be
mistaken. Beckwith argues that the "test of a prophet" in Deuteronomy
18:22 expressly rules out such a possibility: "If a prophet speaks in the
name of the LORD but the thing does not take place or prove true, it is a
word that the LORD has not spoken."28 If God says something will
come to pass and it does not then the divine faithfulness and trustworthiness of the prophets is called into question. The biblical writers wrestled with this issue, particularly regarding the divine repentance. In this
regard, philosopher J. R. Lucas and biblical scholar Terence Fretheim
agree that these are, indeed, "failed" prophecies precisely because God
is the sort of God who changes his mind in response to prayers and contrition. 29 In fact, Jonah includes this idea in his creedal statement:
Yahweh is a "gracious God and merciful, slow to anger, and abounding
in steadfast love, and ready to relent (Hebrew Nacham) from punishing"
(4:2). Both ISF and openness of God models are logically consistent with
the notion of divine repentance and God being "mistaken". Of course, in
a strict sense God would only be mistaken if he said a certain event
would happen for sure and it did not come about. So long as God's
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"failed" predictions are understood in the sense of, "God believed this
would happen but it did not," then there may be no mistake here at all.

6. Predictive Prophecy
It is commonly thought that one of the strongest values of a God with
SF is that he can know the actual future and so is able to inform his
prophets beforehand what precisely will happen. This is thought to give
evidence of divine revelation, accreditation to the prophet and, perhaps,
influence the hearers of the prophecy to live their lives in accordance
with the divine will.
Biblical texts where God is said to "declare the end from the beginning" (Isaiah 46:10) or specific predictions of events which then came
about (e. g. Jesus' prediction of Peter's denial in Luke 22:31-4) are usually given as evidence that God has SF. Such texts can, of course, be
explained by the other views of divine omniscience and do not necessitate SF as an interpretation. 30
There is a logical difficulty which makes this particular understanding of predictive prophecy problematic with both CSF and ISF. As has
already been shown CSF cannot be used as the means by which God
predicts the future for the simple reason that, if God sees history "all at
once" and, presumably, his actions were not foreseen, then God never
foresees any prophets making predictions given by God.
Moreover, it is probably clear by now why ISF cannot be used to predict (in the strong sense) the future. It must be remembered that explaining SF as a logical sequence implies that God does not know precisely
what is going to happen after the event he is foreseeing. If God learns as
he previsions the future then it becomes impossible for God to interject
something based on his knowledge of the future into the chemistry of
past events which would alter his knowledge of what actually occurred
in the past. For instance, if God foresees the whole of Jesus' life, he has
not yet (logically speaking) foreseen the destruction of the Jerusalem
temple in 70 A.D. Once God previsions the events of 70 A.D. it is "too
late" for God to go back and reveal through Jesus a prediction about this
event during the life of Jesus for God never foresaw Jesus uttering such
a prediction.
If God knows all the details and causal antecedents leading up to
event Z and his prediction of event Z based on ISF was not part of this
foreknowledge, then ISF is useless for predicting the future. For God to
make a prediction of Z prior to the occurrence of Z would, presumably,
change the course of history and alter some of the details which God
foresees. Let us say that God·looks ahead and sees that the Babylonian
invasion will happen and then God decides to reveal to Jeremiah that it
will occur in the future. At a minimum, Jeremiah will now know something which he did not know when God first previsioned Jeremiah's life
and words. That is, God "now" knows (logically) that he will provide to
Jeremiah a prediction of event Z at time A, a future event which neither
God nor Jeremiah knew about when God first previsioned time A since
it was not part of his original foreknowledge. This would imply a
change in the divine foreknowledge rendering the original foreknow 1-
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edge incorrect.
Perhaps an illustration will help. Rajesh, wishing to make some
money, may believe that a God with ISF would be in a position to
inform him who will win the next Super Bowl and, if God should inform
him, he could place his bet accordingly. Unfortunately, once God has
"rolled the tape" up to the point where Rajesh makes his request, God
does not yet know who the winner will be. And as God continues to prevision the future he does not foresee his answer to Rajesh until after he
previsions which team actually wins the next Super Bowl. By this time,
however, it is too late for Rajesh to place his bet and it is "too late" for
God to alter the past. This is the converse of the problem raised above in
connection to divine guidance and miracles. In those cases the problem
was that once God knows what will happen he cannot change it. In this
case, once God knows the "past" (as he previsions it sequentially) he
cannot change it.
A God with ISF could, however, inform Rajesh which team he believes
will win the next Super Bowl based upon his exhaustive knowledge of
all the details available to his prevision at the time Rajesh makes his
request. Of course, such a "prediction" will be no different from the sort
of help a God with PK could give him.

7. The Guarantee of the Success of God's plans
It is felt by some proponents of SF that a key value is its ability to
guarantee, from before creation, that God's plans would be successful.
David Clark asserts that "foreknowledge could put God in a position to
promise, with integrity, at the beginning of history, that good will overcome evil."31 Clark believes that a weakness of the openness model is its
inability to guarantee that God will ultimately eliminate evil. He claims
that a God with PK cannot, while a God with SF can, affirm that God
shall conquer evil triumphantly at the end of history while yet granting
lihertarian freedom by which humans sometimes resist the divine wilp2
He goes on to argue that a God with only PK is not in a position to
guarantee, prior to creation, that anyone would come to faith. "Would
anyone believe? One could say that God is infinitely resourceful and
would have started another line like Seth's or called out another Noah.
Yet how could God know that Plan C would work any better than failed
Plans A and B? Could God with integrity promise that Seed would overcome Serpent (Genesis 3:15)? Or would it have been more correct for
God to say, 'I hope to do everything I can so that Seed will strike
Serpent's heel?"'33 Clark feels that redemption itself is threatened if God
lacks foreknowledge-there is too much risk involved otherwise.
Does either version of simple foreknowledge alleviate the risk of creating creatures with libertarian freedom? It has already been shown that
SF does not make creation and providence any less risky than PK. Does
SF enable God to promise from the beginning that his redemptive plans
will succeed? No, for the claim that God uses SF to predict the future
(guarantee success) was shown to fail. Does SF allow God to know
which of plans A or B or C will succeed? No, as David Basinger correctly
responds: "A God with [SF] does know what will occur in the actual
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world-including what humans with indeterministic freedom will freely
choose to do .... But this means, of course, that before God's creative decision was made, he did not know with respect to any creative option containing individuals with indeterministic freedom what such individuals
would freely choose to do if actualized. Thus, he, like a God with PK,
could only 'gamble' on the fact that a desirable state of affairs would
come about."34
"Once" God decides to create this world, then a God with SF can
"look ahead" to see whether anyone with libertarian freedom will come
to faith. But if nobody ever trusts God then what God foreknows is that
his plans have failed. If some people do exercise faith in God then God
foreknows, from the beginning, that his efforts will meet with success.
But the reason for the success is not the divine foreknowledge. Rather,
the reason is that humans freely decided to trust God. Moreover, as has
been shown, God cannot use this foreknowledge to predict the future
and so a God with SF is not in a position to guarantee success from the
beginning. Consequently, a God with SF has no more ability to guarantee the success of his plans than does a God with PK.

Conclusion
If this analysis is correct, then SF (either CSF or ISF) affords God no
greater providential control in these seven areas than does PK. CSF
appears to stymie divine involvement and, though ISF allows for divine
responsiveness to his creatures and enables us to read the biblical texJs
of divine-human dialogue in a more straightforward manner, it results
in explanations essentially identical to the openness model. In passing, it
should be noted that the problems encountered in constructing a coherent account of the providential use of SF are also problems for the doctrine of divine timeless knowledge. Keith Ward has argued that the
appeal to timelessness gives "the illusion of control" but actually does
not enhance providence at al].35 Finally, those who make the common
claim that SF is useful for providence have not given a plausibile
account of how this is so. If the supposed values of SF for providence are
illusory, then the reasons for affirming it are greatly reduced. In which
case, the "live options" regarding the use of omniscience for providential interaction with creatures with indeterministic freedom are narrowed to either molinism or openness.
My preference is to develop an understanding of divine providence from
a PK view of omniscience where God only foreknows what he, himself
determines to do. If God is the risk taker which the openness of God view
affirms then some serious rethinking is in order conceming how God exercises providence. Nevertheless, according to the openness model God is
supremely loving, wise, good, knowledgeable, and powerful. Hence, God
can offer us the greatest possible guidance and protection he can given the
sort of world he chose to create. This God is able to respond to us, dialogue
with us and supply mercy and grace in time of need (Heb 4:16).36
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NOTES

1. Indeterministic freedom is assumed throughout this essay.
2. God may intend to perform a certain action at a particular time unless
conditions are such that an alternate plan is warranted. There are some things (e.
g. the incarnation) which God decrees unilaterally apart from any consideration
of human action. Hence, I make a distinction between absolute and conditional
decrees by God.
3.
David P. Hunt, "Divine Providence and Simple Foreknowledge," Faith
and Philosophy 10, 3 (July, 1993), pp. 394-5.
4. Jack Cottrell, What the Bible Says About God the Ruler (Joplin, MO: College
Press Publishing, 1984), pp. 208-9. It seems that what Cottrell is actually describing is closer to Middle Knowledge than SF.
5. If a God with CSF possesses foreknowledge of his own actions, then the
problem is to explain how the foreknowledge can be the basis for the actions
when it already includes the actions. As William Hasker says in his God, Time, and
Knowledge (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 63, "[I]t is impossible
that God should use a foreknowledge derived from the actual occurance of
future events to determine his own prior actions in the providential governance
of the world." See also note seven below.
6. Hunt, "Divine Providence," p. 408.
7. This problem holds unless, of course, one wishes to say that God sees his
own actions in his foreknowledge (which, it seems, SF needs to affrim). God
would then know what he is going to do before he makes up his mind and God
would be unable to plan, anticipate or decide (see Eleanore Stump and Norman
Kretzman, "Eternity" Journal of Philosophy, 78, no. 8 [August, 1981]: 446).
Unfortunately, this calls the divine freedom and omnipotence into question making God a prisoner of his omniprescience (see J. R. Lucas, "Foreknowledge and
the Vulnerability of God," in Godfrey Vesey ed., The Philosophy in Christianity
[New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989], p. 126).
8. William P. Alston suggests this possibility in his "Divine-Human
Dialogue and the Nature of God," Faith and Philosophy 2, no. 1 (Jan. 1985), p. 17;
Hunt hints at it in his "Divine Providence and Simple Foreknowledge," p. 412;
and William Hasker clearly explains it in his God, Time, and Knowledge, pp. 57-9.
9. All time related terms used in this discussion are meant in a logical rather
than temporal fashion. After all, an atemporal deity does not literally have
"fore" knowledge.
10. John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, revised ed. (New York: Harper and
Row, 1978), p. 69.
11. Lorenzo McCabe, The Foreknowledge of God (Cincinnati, OH: Cranston
and Stowe, 1887), p. 364. See also his Divine Nescience of Future Contingencies a
Necessity (New York: Phillips and Hunt, 1862). Though verbose McCabe's two
books contain many of the same arguments being used by contemporary
defenders of PK.
12. Cottrell, God the Ruler, p. 214. I do not understand how Cottrell can consistently maintain both that the future is closed for God and that God is able to
alter that same future.
13. Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, pp. 57-8. Keith Ward makes the same
point in his Rational Theology and the Creativity of God (New York, Pilgrim Press,
1982), p. 152.
14. The tape metaphor may, itself, be deceiving since it assumes the future is
available to be known. That is, even if God should stop the tape the rest of the
future is there to be known and if God knows it is there to be known, then it is
difficult to understand how God's actions would change anything.
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Consequently, ISF may not be a legitimate alternative to CSF. I owe this observation to a referee of this journal.
15. Although writers such as McCabe and Cottrell do not refer to middle
knowledge, at times it seems they have something like it in mind. Actually, I
believe many proponents of SF need middle knowledge to warrant their claims.
But then, SF will have been forfeited. Interestingly, Arminius affirmed a version
of middle knowledge. See The Writings of James Arminius, 3 vols., trans. James
Nichols (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1956), 1:248 and Richard A. Muller, God, Creation,
and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius (Grand Rapids, Baker, 1991),154-7.
16. Quoted in McCabe, Foreknowledge of God, p. 25.
17. See my "Historical Considerations," in Clark Pinnock et. al., The Openness
of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove,
IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994), pp. 72-75, 91.
18. If God responds in this way, then election is a bilateral choosing and not
a unilateral act of God. Moreover, if as God looks ahead in history he does not
yet know whether, for instance, Saul will come to faith in Jesus, then it makes
sense for God to encourage him towards salvation. But if God already knows
that Saul will never come to faith, then what does this make of God's attempts to
convert him? Are such attempts genuine? It could be argued that God makes
genuine efforts to save those he knows will never actually come to faith, but
whatever reasons one adduces for such divine actions, it will not be for the benefit of Saul. McCabe, (Foreknowledge of God, p. 353), asks, "Is it possible to conceive
of God's putting forth efforts with that burning earnestness which the urgent
necessities of the case demand, in order to snatch from everlasting death an
endangered moral agent when he"'is absolutely certain that that agent is going
forward to endless perdition?"
19. Phillip Yancy and G. K. Chesterton both assert that God was "courageous" in creating this sort of world. See Yancy, "Cosmic Combat," Christianity
Today 38, no. 14 (Dec. 12, 1994), p. 21.
20. C. S. Lewis, "On Special Providences" in Miracles (New York: Macmillan,
1974), pp. 180-7.
21. Some proponents of SF speak as though God had gaps in his foreknowledge. For instance, they sometimes speak as though God knows exactly what
sort of person Abe will become while God does not know whether Abe and
Mandie actually get married. But if God knows Abe's future character then he
would also know whether or not they got married. See, for example, David
Hunt, "Divine Providence and Simple Foreknowledge," p. 409.
22. I am not here addressing the issue of how libertarian freedom affects
what God does or does not do in answer to such prayers. I am only examining
how such prayers make sense within the theory of SF.
23. See my "Historical Considerations," in Clark Pinnock et. al., The
Openness of God, pp. 69-91. For some Medieval Jewish philosophical reflections
on the matter see Seymour Feldman, "The Binding of Isaac: A Test-Case of
Divine Foreknowledge," in Tamar Rudavsky, Divine Omniscience and

Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish and Christian Perspectives
(Boston: D. Reidel, 1985), pp.l05-133.
24. Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, 5.3.
25. Augustine, On Free Will,3.2.4.
26. Beckwith, "Limited Omniscience and the Test For a Prophet: A Brief
Philosophical Analysis," Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 36, mo. 3
(Sept. 1993), p. 359.
27. Three times the text says that God gives the signs for the benefit of the
leaders of Israel-not for Moses' benefit (at least, not for his benefit alone).
Moreover, God says, if they do not believe you. Terence Fretheim discusses
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divine uses of "if' in the Hebrew Bible and concludes they are genuine conditionals for God. God's response to Moses' question indicates that not even God
knew for sure the people would believe. See his The Suffering of God: An Old
Testament Perspective (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), pp. 47-9 and Exodus,
Interpretation (Louisville, KY: John Knox, 1991), p. 68. In addition, CSF does not
allow such divine-human dialogue to take place at all which leads back to the
same problem discussed in note number 4 above.
28. It seems that Beckwith reads this verse as a sort of philosophical principle-a timeless truth-removed from its cultural context and insufficiently
nuanced with other texts related to the issue. For instance, in the book of Jonah
the prophet announces doom upon the city of Ninevah which never comes
about. Elijah foretold judgment upon king Ahab which never came to pass (texts
which Beckwith does not address). In both stories there is no conditional element
in the foretold doom. If Beckwith's understanding of the test of a prophet is correct then both Jonah and Elijah gave false prophecies. I suggest the verse be
understood as a guiding rule (rather than a universal principle) which does not
overide the divine freedom to modify the divine judments in favor of mercy
should God choose to do so.
29. See J. R. Lucas, The Future (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp.
222-3, and his "Foreknowledge and the Vulnerability of God," p. 119; Terence
Fretheim, "Prayer in the Old Testament," in Paul Sponheim ed., A Primer on
Prayer (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988)' p. 59 and his The Suffering of God, pp. 45-59.
30. For instance, PK can interpret these texts as referring to acts that God has
decided to perform (which is what Is 46:10 explicitly goes on to say!) and so no
foreknowledge is involved. Jesus' prediction of Peter's denial can be explained
by proponents of PK as an instance where Jesus knew his disciples and the situation so well that he could make such a statement-though it was most likely a
conditional one which could have been falsified. See Pinnock, The Openness of
God pp. 50-3 and McCabe's two works cited above which deal in depth with this
issue. Admittedly, more work needs to be done in explaining these types of texts
by the proponents of PK.
Problematic, and commonly overlooked by proponents of SF, are the numerous occasions where biblical predictions either do not come to pass at all (e. g.
Jonah and 2 Kings 20) or not in the exact way they were foretold (e. g. Gen 27:2740 where Jacob's blessing is qualified by Esau's blessing; Gen 37:6-10 where
Joseph's parents never bow down to him; and Acts 21:11 where it is predicted,
incorrectly, that the Jews will deliver Paul over to the Gentiles). Presumably a
God with SF would not err in predicting the future in any details.
31. David K. Clark, "A Response to The Openness of God," unpublished
paper given at the Evangelical Philosophical Society, November 18, 1994 in
Chicago, p. 7.
32. Clark, Ibid., pp. 4-5.
33. Clark, Ibid., p. 7.
34. David Basinger, "Divine Knowledge and Divine Control: A Response to
Gordon and Sadowsky," Religious Studies, 26, no. 2 (June, 1990), p. 274.
35. Ward, Rational Theology, pp. 162-3. Ward observes that the real issue is
the necessity of divine omnipotence for a temporal deity can easily control every
present and future situation if he so decides.
36. I would like to thank William Hasker, David Basinger and the referees of
this journal for making some helpful suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper.

